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Zürich, 22. November 2003

Following MEBO’s explosive enquiries, the miscarriage of justice in the Lockerbie affair has to be corrected in favour of ABDELBASET AL MEGRAHI in order to reinstate the condemned innocent and restore to him his freedom and honour.

THE FINAL LOCKERBIE AFFAIR REPORT, résumé by MEBO

In the Scottish miscarriage of justice regarding the Lockerbie affair MEBO’s Gordian knot is finally untangled…

In order to be able to reach the conclusion, as was the case in the Lockerbie verdict, that the Libyan citizen ABDELBASET AL MEGRAHI was responsible for the fatal smuggling of an alleged ‘Bomb Bag’ onto PanAm flight PA-103 via MaltaAir flight KM-180, an unknown criminal network would previously have had to have been established.

In the official US Indictment of 14th of November 1991 against both of the accused AMIN KHALIFA FHIMAH and ABDELBASET AL MEGRAHI, as well as in the winter 1988/89 PanAm flight schedule and in several Kamp van Zeist court transcripts the PanAm flight numbers were clearly recorded.

Flight Nr. PA-103 (main flight) was how the Boeing 747 destroyed in the explosion over Lockerbie was denoted. The corresponding feeder flight from Frankfurt FRA to London (LHR) was described as PanAm flight Nr. PA-103/A.

Following intensive investigation on the part of MEBO with the aim of a better understanding of the events depicted, as well as of the complicated course of events associated with the Lockerbie tragedy, the main flight from London Heathrow (LHR) to New York (JFK) was described as flight Nr. PA-103/B.

Furthermore, it is clear that there was no official flight (B). It seems strange that on the 3 PTM-Telex payment slips from TXL, KOPA , Berlin and on the passenger list (Prod. 199) it was the end letter (B) as opposed to (A) which was used in connection with the relevant transfer = PA-103/B.

As MEBO Ltd. already stated in Part A-F, there had been a change on the passenger list in that the number of pieces of inter-line luggage of passenger # 99, KAREN NOONAN, had been changed from 3 to 2 pieces by an unknown party. This unlawful manipulation had created a free inter-line baggage place. The party for the prosecution took skilful advantage of this free place in order to fake a fictitious ‘Malta Bomb Bag’ and put it in its place. This fabricated claim evidently encouraged the courts for their part to put forward or even to accept as fact their own creation in the form of the ‘Phantom Transfer’ of an alleged ‘Bomb Bag’ from MaltaAir KM-180 onto PanAm PA-103/A.

By means of the enlargement of the digit number 2 on a copier, MEBO established that the digit 3 had been altered to a digit 2. As the digit on the FAG/KIK printout had been printed using an ink-jet printer, no more than a minor alteration was required to make the 3 into a 2.

It could be proven that passenger # 99, KAREN NOONAN, had in fact originally checked in 3 items of baggage at the check-in point at Vienna Schwechat airport. The 3 pieces of baggage were allocated the following inter-line tray no. at transfer in Frankfurt (FRA).:

B-10467, B-10773, B-3546, (Ticket, Prod. No.1151, image 27. Loading no. 1060)

This confirms that disregarding the alteration of the passenger list, a total of 13 inter-line bags were transferred from different flights, though none from MaltaAir KM-180 onto PA-103/A in Frankfurt (FRA).

With reference to the X-ray logbook with data on flight PA-103/A it was established beyond doubt that only 13 inter-line baggage items were loaded via X-ray onto the feeder flight PanAm 103/A and recorded on the FAG/KIK computer printout. It was possible beyond any doubt to trace all 13 inter-line items of baggage coded with tray numbers back to their relative feeder flights. The alleged inter-line ‘Bomb Bag’ tray no. B-8849 was not included in the 13, as it could clearly be traced back to an original on-line bag from flight no. PA-643 from Berlin-Tegel, and therefore didn’t pass through the X-ray control point. This totally refutes the possibility of an inter-line bag transfer from MaltaAir flight KM-180 to flight PA-103/A. (Prod. 1791 FAA Rapport).

List of the 13 inter-line bags according to the FAG/KIK ‘printout, loading list’ TADD, 881221, F1042 for feederflight PA-103/A in (FRA):

Tray no.: B-4809, B-6001, B-7418, B-5620, B-3148, B-4573, *B-3546, *B-10773, *B-10467, B-5203, B-5936, B-8042, B-5070 (* (3) bags belonging to Passenger 99, K. Noonan)

To ensure the credibility of the MaltaAir transfer a further criminal misrepresentation of the facts was necessary in order to show that the item of inter-line baggage with tray no. B-8849 was delivered from MaltaAir flight KM-180 to Frankfurt (FRA) (on-block time 12.48, parked on V141).

As was correctly portrayed during the court case in Kamp van Zeist, all inter-line baggage from MaltaAir KM-180 was processed on the 21.12.1988 in Frankfurt (FRA) between 12.04 and 13.10 hours at Desk no. 206 in Hall V3, and forwarded to the various transit flights. The assumption, or rather the fabricated claim to the effect that a supposed ‘Bomb Bag’ with tray no. B-8849 was transferred from Luqa-Malta via flight MaltaAir KM-180 to PanAm flight PA-103/A in Frankfurt (FRA) has in view of recent evidence been proven to be erroneous.

Actual facts related to the baggage handling:

An on-line bag B1 (prior notice of this was relayed via PTM-Telex (TXLKOPA 21/11.26) and 1 passenger arrived with feeder flight PA-643 from Berlin-Tegel at 12.45 in Frankfurt (FRA). On the same day at the same counter no. 206 at 13.07 the bag, together with the baggage from MaltaAir KM-180 was registered with the inter-line coding :
No.: B-8849--F-1042--S-0009+Z-13.07--TO--HS-33--+Z-1517--B-044+Z-1523
and was transferred with tray no.B-8849 to PanAm flight PA-103/A in (FRA). Unfortunately the additional on-line bag delivered from flight PA-643 was not noted on the worksheet by the coder, Mr. KOCA. It was common practice in cases such as this when only one or two bags from another airline were being added to those currently being coded from the main airline, that the extra bags were not especially recorded on the worksheet. Although the bag B-8849 was coded at the same time as the baggage from MaltaAir flight KM-180 it cannot possibly be classified as a MaltaAir bag for the following reasons:

Were the bag from MaltaAir it would have been the 14th inter-line bag had the manipulation of the digits on the passenger list (passenger no. 99, KAREN NOONAN) reducing the 3 to a 2 not taken place. There were however only 13 inter-line bags confirmed and whatsmore none from MaltaAir transferred via x-ray , registered on the FAG/KIK loading printout and loaded onto PA-103/A (confirmed in FAA flight investigation report, Zeist Prod. No. 1791)

An additional factor is that all airport inter-line coding stations in V3 and HM were so programmed that the operating system was capable of processing assorted pieces of baggage through the system from different airlines and with different flight numbers concurrently to their various connecting flights.

The prerequisite for the proper functioning of this system was that the data recorded, such as ( incoming flight, + number + outgoing flight + number), had to correspond to the previously stored reference data of the FAG and PanAm Division. In the event of the data not corresponding there would be no possibility of being able to transfer a piece of luggage onto a transit flight . A rogue piece of luggage would in such a case either be directed to the control channel for examination by specialists, further handling and, if possible, transfer to the correct flight, or be directed to the lost property office.

To further increase security, PanAm flight processing procedure dictated that 2 different organizations checked all pieces of baggage to make sure the correct number of baggage items was registered:

• once by FAG upon registering at the respective coding counter as recorded on the KIK computer printout.
• A second time at the loading gate, from where the baggage with the loading list was divided into 4 different loading groups (hold 1-4) by PanAm’s own personnel from FAG. This process ensured that the pieces of baggage loaded onto flightPA-103/A corresponded to the number of items of baggage recorded on the FAG/KIK computer printout and that baggage in London Heathrow could be forwarded to the correct destinations (Zeist Prod. No. 1060).

A further fatal error relates to the demonstrably false conclusion on the part of the court that the on-line bag in question from PanAm flight PA-643 (TXL) was loaded directly onto flight PA-103/A, that’s to say outwith the tarmac, and was for this reason not recorded on the FAG/KIK loading printout. This on-line bag which was coded as an inter-line bag was in fact the bag B1 as indicated on the PTM/LDM-Telex ZCZC FSAA207 211130 + AA to FRAKPA, FRAUSPA. FRAOOPA (Zeist Prod. No. 1089)

Confirmation:

The bag in question, destined for tray no. B-8849, was an on-line bag coded as inter-line, from flight PA-643 from Berlin-Tegel. The feeder flight PanAm PA-643 was in Frankfurt (on-block) at 12.45. Because the on-line connecting flight PA-124/103/A arrived 3 hours and 4 minutes later and wasn’t on-block in Frankfurt until 15.49, the on-line bag later coded as B-8849 couldn’t be directly loaded from aircraft PA-643 to aircraft PA-103/A. The bag was coded according to FAG/PA regulation at 13.07 at inter-line counter no. 206 in Hall V3 and checked in as an inter-line bag with tray no. B-8849 to the FAG baggage distribution system. At 15.17 the bag B-8849 was retrieved from storage depot HS-33 and forwarded for loading on flight PA-103/A at Gate B-44. Yet the courtroom in Zeist chose to disregard the weighty information provided on page one of the FAG traffic assistant (witness no. 799)’s log book (Prod. 1062). Why? There it should have been recognized beyond any doubt that any direct loading of baggage from flight PA-643 onto flight PA-103/A would have been impossible timewise. (PS: In Zeist only Prod. 1062, image 3 was presented)

A further mistaken assumption on the part of the court was that the bag B-8849 although on-line had been coded as inter-line because of the West Berlin Status (4 Powers Status). With regard to both the judiciary and the court in Kamp van Zeist there appeared to be uncertainty about the West Berlin Status. Under such circumstances the party for the prosecution were easily able to persuade the judges that bag B-8849 was a normal inter-line transfer from MaltaAir KM-180. Whatsmore a false statement was issued by traffic assistant GUNTHER KASTELEINER, witness no. 799, saying:
’25 inter-line bags were loaded onto PA-103/A’.

KASTELEINER counted the 13 inter-line together with the 12 on-line (coded as inter-line) bags, and thus reached the false total of 25 inter-line bags. Because the Defence Team Duff & Taylor couldn’t grasp the complicated sequence of events related to the baggage transfer, no objections were raised on their side, with disastrous consequences for the accused ABDELBASET AL MEGRAHI.

P.S. *The 4 Power Status of the Allied Occupied Zone of Berlin (USA, UK, FR, USSR) . Because of the allied status in 1988, on-line passengers and their baggage travelling between West Berlin and Frankfurt am Main (BRD) were upon arrival in Frankfurt dealt with as inter-line passengers/baggage. (see details, Part (A), 2nd title) Here we have a further decisive factor leading to the wrongful conclusion that bag no. B-8849 was an inter-line bag. FYI: The fall of the Berlin Wall didn’t take place until 1989.

The computerized baggage system (FAG) in Frankfurt in 1988 was able without fail to distinguish on-line from inter-line bags after coding, although on-line was coded as *inter-line bag. Such on-line baggage was *not directed through the x-ray control point as the x-ray control had already been carried out in Berlin-Tegel. Only the PanAm on-line passengers/baggage from Berlin-Tegel (TXL) coded as inter-line were indicated on the passenger list as follows:
(Prod. No. 199) Passenger No. and name, destination airport, pertaining to (LHR), seat no. @*, no. of pieces of baggage (M) – (*TXL). An (o) was only for transfer passengers/ baggage who were booked in London Heathrow (LHR) onto the mainflight PA-103 to (NY JFK)

The possibility remains that the letter B at the end of the flight number PA 103/B, on the PTM/LDM telex and on the passenger list was the result of a further manipulation. Officially the feederflight PA-103 should have had the letter A at the end – PA-103/A. Were it the case that a manipulation had taken place, the unknown planners who devised the flight plan:
Malta---Frankfurt---London-Heathrow---NY-JFK
and the transfer of the ‘Bomb Bag’ were apparently keeping a second option in reserve in the event of the court not accepting the truth of the first version of the story.

Possible second version: Transfer of the alleged ‘Bomb Bag’ via PanAm PA-634 from Berlin-Tegel – Frankfurt/Main-London-Heathrow-New York-JFK.

Justification:
As was stated at the beginning of page 1, there was officially only the mainflight PanAm PA-103 from (LHR to NY-JFK) as well as the feeder flight PanAm PA-103/A from (FRA to LHR).

Someone must therefore deliberately have manipulated both the PTM/LDM Telex, (TXLKOPA/211126) to FRAKPPA and the passenger list on the feeder flight PA0643/21FRA-PA103A/21-LHRO/01,B1), changing them to PA103B/21-LHRO/01,B1. This was done in order to be able to explain if necessary that the letter B refers to the mainflight PA-103 in (LHR), thus explaining why bag B-8849 which was registered on the PTM-telex had been booked from flight PA-643 via PA-103/A in Frankfurt onto the second transit flight "B”, the main flight PA-103 in Heathrow (Production 1089, Image 210, Image 212,216)

Following MEBO’s investigations it can be said with certainty that the on-line bag coded as inter-line no. B-8849 was transferred from PA-643 from Berlin-Tegel (TXL) via transfer onto PA-103/A to London-Heathrow, but from there was not loaded onto the main flight PA-103. All transfer bags from Berlin-Tegel (TXL) were checked out in London Heathrow and according to police enquiries were able to be matched up definitively with all the corresponding ex (TXL) passengers. One exception to this is the unaccompanied ‘rebooked baggage’ from the ex flights PA-637/639/107 from where it was established that only one of 2 HUBBARD’s Samsonite bags with R-tags were transferred to the main flight PA-103.
Should it emerge that the incorrect flight description PA-103/B, i.e. with the letter B at the end, is an internally agreed PanAm definition for flight PA-103/A, this would prove in addition that bag no. B-8849 was only booked to (LHR) London-Heathrow and was not loaded onto the main flight PA-103 to (NY-JFK).
This established 3 facts, namely that the supposed ‘Bomb Bag’ with tray no. B-8849 as ‘invented’ by the court in Zeist:

1. Was not transferred from MaltaAir flight KM-180 to the feeder flight PA-103/A, but from PA-643 (TXL) to PA-103/A to (LHR).
2. Neither was it loaded onto the fateful flight PanAm PA-103, because there was no official flight (PA-103/B LHR) as was intimated on the PTM/LDM –telex.
3. The passenger indicated on the PTM/LDM-telex (Prod. 1089, Image 210) with bag B1 from flight PA-643 from Berlin-Tegel (TXL) was able to be identified as passenger no. 33, Mr. ANDERSON, a 1st class passenger. ANDERSON had booked too late and had therefore to accept a 1st class reservation in Berlin-Tegel. In addition it was established that Mr. ANDERSON and his bag no. B-8849 either ended his journey in London-Heathrow (LHR) or continued his journey on another flight however not with PA-103. Why were these aspects not investigated?

Consequently the transfer of what was in any case a perfectly normal travel bag no. B-8849 onto PA-103 can be categorically ruled out. (Prod. 1089)

In addition, enquiries showed that only 2 (TXL) passengers without bags were booked on transit from Berlin-Tegel via PA-103 to (New York JFK) – this according to the passenger list (Prod. 199) which indicated them with the letter (o) for on-line. The two passengers were positively identified as no. 101, Mr. PITT J. and no. 148, Mr. TOMIG, E. PITT’s colleague E. TOMIG, for reasons that are not known, didn’t in fact board flight PA-103 to (New York- JFK) in London Heathrow despite having made the reservation. Why also was this aspect not highlighted by the court?

Thus it is clear that the notion of a phantom ‘Bomb Bag’, ex tray no. B-8849 fabricated by the court in Kamp van Zeist can be ruled out beyond doubt. Equally the courts fateful claim that Abdelbaset Al Megrahi had smuggled the said bag – ex B-8849 vial MaltaAir onto PanAm 103….

‘The error of judgement:’
The alleged ‘Bomb Bag’ cited by the court in Kamp van Zeist during the so-called Lockerbie verdict with tray no.:
B-8849, F1042, S-0009 + Z1307 -TO - HS33 + Z1517 - B044 + Z1523
is positively not an inter-line bag transfer from MaltaAir KM-180 onto PanAm flight PA 103/A in (FRA) but is rather an on-line bag, coded as inter-line sent from PanAm flight PA-643 from Berlin Tegel (TXL) and then transferred to the on-line feeder flight PA-103/A.

The alleged ‘Bomb Bag’ tray no. B-8849 was a normal passenger bag which according t0 the loading list was sent via flight PA-103/A to London-Heathrow but following a baggage check was not loaded onto the main flight PanAm PA-103.

It is clear that as far as the unidentified criminals behind the Lockerbie affair were concerned it was imperative for logistical reasons that the Frankfurt/Main airport remain at the centre of the alleged ‘Bomb Bag’ transfer.

Only this would allow the actual strategic scene of the crime, namely London-Heathrow (LHR) airport, where the break-in to the baggage storage depot for flight PA-103 in Terminal 3 took place, to be kept secret in advance. Not to mention the mysterious events surrounding JOHN HUBBARD’s bag.

At this point in time trustworthy, provable sources categorically rule out the notion both of Frankfurt airport as being a transfer point and of MaltaAir flight KM-180 smuggling in a strange bag.

As MEBO’s review (a product of thorough research) of the complete baggage transfer from Frankfurt/Main via PA-103/A to London-Heathrow up until the main flight PA-103 has been found to correspond, the only bag which might, this 21st of November 2003, come into question as a possible ‘Bomb Bag’ might be one of two unaccompanied Samsonite bags belonging to the pilot JOHN HUBBARD, having been apparently swapped over in (LHR).

Justification:
The witness statement of the pilot JOHN HUBARD in a Frankfurt court testifies to the fact that he had checked in 2 brown hard-shell Samsonite bags at around 7am on the 21st of December 1988. The bags, unaccompanied and fastened with R-tags at Berlin-Tegel, had been checked onto the following flights:
From (TXL) with flight PA-637 to Frankfurt, with PA-107 from (FRA) to London Heathrow and from there with PA-123 to (SEA) Seattle. Flight PA-637 was delayed and was supposedly handled jointly with flight PA-639. 8 passengers from flight PA-637/639 (?) were able to be checked onto flight PA-107 to (LHR) shortly before ‘off-block’ and without their luggage, this in order to ensure their transfer onto flight PA-123 in London-Heathrow (LHR) to Seattle (SEA).
On the 21st of December 1988 between 11.52 and 12.03 the 9 bags plus two 2 unaccompanied bags – those of the PanAm pilot JOHN HUBBARD- that is a total of 11 bags were, according to Worksheet No. 0000074, recorded at the inter-line counter no. 5 in Hall Mitte and registered with Code (S-0072 + Z1159/Z1200) although on-line as inter-line (as originating from Berlin-Tegel baggage) with Code: (S-0072 – Z1159/Z1200) on the KIK loading printout ‘TADD’ of flight PA-103/A (Prod. No. 1060)
These unaccompanied bags, 11 in total, were checked from flight PA-637/639/107 onto flight PA-103/A and, being on-line, were loaded without passing through x-ray control. This baggage was registered on the FAG/KIK Computer Printout under the following tray numbers:
B-0622, B-1898, B-4971, B-8238, B-12244, B-11435, B-10852, B-6696, B-6559, B-6391, B-2377.

Following a check of the items of luggage and by relating them to individual flight numbers it is possible to confirm today that the sole inconsistency or possible discrepancy was in relation to the two (2) unaccompanied HUBBARD bags. Owing to the number of bags it is evident that both of the said bags were transported to London-Heathrow (LHR) with flight PA-103/A. One (1) of HUBBARD’s bags with an R-tag was discovered by police in the destroyed container AVE 4041 PA of the PanAm machine PA-103 in Lockerbie. No explosive device (IED) had been in the bag, therefore it can be ruled out as a possible ‘Bomb Bag’. The bag was later identified by JOHN HUBBARD.

HUBBARD’s second Samsonite bag was sent on another flight from (LHR) to Seattle and handed over to HUBBARD two days later.

With regard to the mysterious break-in in PanAm’s baggage storage depot at Terminal 3 in London-Heathrow, it is possible that a brown hard-shell ‘Samsonite’ bag adapted to make a ‘Bomb Bag’ was smuggled in, as the police didn’t register any theft. Thus it would have been possible during loading of the baggage onto PA-103 for pilot JOHN HUBBARD’s original bag to be exchanged for the supposedly ‘adapted’ ‘Bomb Bag’ of identical appearance, namely brown, hard-shell, type Samsonite ‘Silhouette 4000’, without attracting any attention.

The aircraft PA-103 was positioned in (LHR) on Stand K14. The feeder flight from Frankfurt PA-103/A was parked on Stand K16, that is to say not far away from the Boeing 747 ‘Maid of See’. The pilot JOHN HUBBARD’s 2 bags were each labelled with R-tags. Both on-line bags were, according to the loading plan, together with other on-line baggage, loaded onto PA-103/A in Frankfurt and constituted the final baggage being loaded into the loading bay ‘Hold/1’ of the Boeing 727. (Prod. No. 1070, Image 1). PanAm had specifically arranged the loading in this way in order that the on-line baggage could be quickly unloaded in (LHR) and transferred onto the main flight PA-103 to New York (JFK).

Because the baggage came first, followed in Hold/2 by mail sacks for London, in Hold/3 parcels for London and in Hold/4 passenger luggage for London it was clear to the baggage crew that the whole of the 1st on-line baggage up to and including the mail sacks was destined for flight PA-103. Therefore someone must deliberately have misdirected the one Hubbard bag.

Something which strangely enough did not become apparent until the first appeal was in process was the fact that during the night of the 20th to the 21st of December there was a break-in in the baggage loading depot (CP2) for the early luggage for PA-103 in Terminal 3. The report compiled by the security officials there was not made public during the first trial. Why? Why was such a serious aspect not investigated? Or were such mysterious occurrences as the break-in and the HUBBARD incident only recorded in the police notebooks which were mistakenly shredded?

As was confirmed in a witness statement, several bags were already in Container AVE 4041PA before the baggage from PA-103/A was loaded there. MEBO received information from a reliable earlier source from (Ms LINDA MACK) that prior to the loading of Container AVE 4041PA there were already 7 bags located there, some of which originated from CyprusAir flight CY-504 from Larnaka (LAR), Cyprus. Some of these bags belonged to the CIA/DNA DEA passengers booked on PA-103.
During the short passage of transfer between the two aircraft a prepared ‘Bomb Bag’ must by some unknown means have been smuggled beforehand instead of the missing HUBBARD bag into the container or into the loading bay of the Boeing 747. This alone would enable the total # of pieces of baggage transferred on-line from Frankfurt to tally with the loading list of PA-103.

From the court minutes, Appeal, Kamp van Zeist:
JOHN BEDFORD, a loader-driver employed by PanAm, and Mr. PARMAR, another PanAm employee were working in the inter-line shed. Mr. BEDFORD set aside container AVE4041/PA to receive inter-line baggage for PA-103. The container was identified as the container for PA-103 by Mr. BEDFORD who wrote the information on a sheet which was placed in a holder fixed to the container. A number of items were placed in that container.
Later Mr. BEDFORD drove the container to a position near the baggage build-up area and left it there. From there, the container was taken out to stand K16, and baggage for New York unloaded from PA-103/A was loaded into it. The evidence of Mr. BEDFORD together with that of PETER WALKER, a supervisor in the baggage build-up area, and DARSAN SANDHU, a chief loader, and with the container build-up sheet (Prod. 1217), shows that container AVE 4041PA contained both inter-line baggage which had been placed in the interline shed, and baggage unloaded from PA-103/A. When it was full, container AVE 4041PA was driven directly to stand 14 and loaded into the hold.
The evidence of Mr. TERENCE CRABTREE, another driver-loader employed by PanAm, who was the crew chief for the loading of PA-103:
There was also some baggage from PA-103/a which was loaded *loose into the hold of PA-103! Mr. BEDFORD said that he recalled that on 21st December 1988 he had set aside container AVE 4041PA for baggage for PA-103. He recalled also that he had placed a number of suitcases in the container. These cases were placed on their spines in a row along the back of the container.
He said that he had left the interline shed to have a cup of tea with Mr. WALKER in the build-up area. On his return, he saw that two cases had been added to the container. These cases were laid on their sides, with the handles towards the interior of the container, in the way that he would normally have loaded them. The arrangement of these cases was shown in a set of photographs (production 1114) taken in early January 1989 in Mr. BEDFORD’s presence.
Mr. BEDFORD said that he had been told by Mr. Kamboj that he had placed the additional two suitcases in the container during his absence. Mr. Kamboj denied that he had placed any suitcases in the container during his absence. Mr. Kamboj denied that he had placed any suitcases in the container and denied also that he had told Mr. BEDFORD that he had done so. Both witnesses were referred to a number of police statements which they gave at various times and to their evidence at the Fatal Accident Inquiry into the disaster, and it appears that each of the witnesses has consistently given the same account throughout. Mr. Kamboj eventually conceded in evidence, in a half-hearted way, that what Mr. BEDFORD said might be correct, but the contradiction is not resolved. Mr. BEDFORD was a clear and impressive witness and he had no reason to invent what he said.

As verified by a witness, single bags were placed into the hold of the PA-103. This fact supports the theory of MEBO and expert Professor Hitmar Schubert, namely that the alleged ‘Bomb Bag’ was placed not inside the container but rather between the container AVE 4041PA and the aircraft wall of the Boeing 747 at (Pos. 700). The distance from the sloping front side of the container to the aircraft wall was approximately 12 inches, sufficient space into which the alleged ‘Bomb Bag’, a Samsonite case type ‘Silhouette 4000’ (26in. X 20in. x 10in.) could be fitted.
Fragmented aluminium pieces of the side wall of the aircraft taken from the shatter zone, at the centre of the explosion at (Pos. 700 Frames, 720 + Stringer 38 left), are, according to an explosives expert, clearly indicative of the following: the deformation of the bizarre, torn-off edges of the metal parts indicate unmistakeably that the explosion took place near the wall (skin) of the aircraft! The alleged site of the explosion in container AVE 4041PA is, due to the large distance of 25 inches = 63,5 cm to the outside wall of the aircraft, not tenable.

It should not be forgotten with regard to the latter that MEBO informed the court at the beginning of the Lockerbie trial of the questionable distance in the official (AAIB). Thereupon court proceedings were adjourned for 12 days in order to clarify this point, during which time Mr. CLAIDEN (an engineering inspector) (AAIB) had to admit to the court that the distance statement was wrong and should have read only 13 inches instead of 25 inches. This being the case it could be that the explosion of the (IED) took place not in the container AFE 4041PA, but between the aircraft wall (skin) and the sloping front side, outside of the container. (Professor Dr. Hitmar Schubert is an expert at the Fraunhofer (?) Institute of Technology and Science in Germany. He is a world renowned expert in questions related to explosives).

This further confirms that the alleged ‘Bomb Bag’ was loaded onto PA-103 in London-Heathrow and not, as was assumed by the court, in Frankfurt on the feeder flight PA-103/A.

If a comparison were drawn between the detailed, pertinent nature of the questioning of the Frankfurt witnesses and the general nature of the questions addressed to witnesses in London-Heathrow, a cross-examination style which is significantly lacking would be seen to be in evidence.

In retrospect it appears both outrageous and irresponsible that of all parties involved in the Lockerbie trial in Kamp van Zeist, the conspicuously mysterious incident involving JOHN HUBBARD’s ‘Samsonite’ bag in (LHR) was not awarded their immediate attention. It is difficult to believe, but the incident was not mentioned once. This had negative consequences for the condemned Abdelbaset Al Megrahi. Meanwhile the number of questionable occurrences related to HUBBARD’s bag have accumulated.

On the worksheet Prod. No. 0000074 the flight number of PanAm on the second and third line was later changed by hand to PA-639. Underneath the change on the third line the previous handwritten no. 107 can clearly and unmistakeably be identified.

Upon questioning the witness, no. 800 JOACHIM KOSCHA about the overwritten part, again only an extremely unsatisfactory level of questioning ensued, as follows:

Excerpt from the court minutes, Kamp van Zeist:
Next, image 74, please. And the third entry down from the top, please. Does that disclose no starting time? ---A-Yes.—Q- And does it disclose a finishing time of 12.03?---A-Yes.---Q-In relation to one wagon of baggage?---A-Yes.----Q-Does the preceding entry also disclose a finishing time of 12.03?---A-Yes.---Q-The entry in the third—the third entry, then, cannot be accurate, assuming the preceding one is?---A-At least I would say it’s not understandable.---Q-Thank you. And in relation to both these entries –that’s the second one from top and the third one from the top –the flight numbers would appear to have been altered?---A-I think they have been overwritten.---Q- Overwritten. End.

In addition Counter No. 5 is falsely numbered on the worksheet and doesn’t correspond to the Code S-0072 of the 11 pieces of baggage. The correct entry would have been Counter No. 4. It would appear by this that someone was attempting to cloud over the general picture.

Because of the fact that the illegal overwriting with PA-639 on the (Prod. ‘Image 74’) carelessly went unquestioned by anyone in the court, the extremely mysterious case of JOHN HUBBARD’s ‘Samsonite’ bag in London-Heathrow was able to be kept secret. Why?

Moreover an investigation would now have to be set up to establish whether the illegal overwriting of PA-639 was a deliberate attempt to cover up a criminal motive. Furthermore it is essential to determine whether the overwriting on Worksheet No. 0000074 with a flight number PA-639 which possibly didn’t exist was carried out in order that 12 years later in the Kamp van Zeist courtroom it could no longer be established where the 11 bags – inclusive of the 2 bags belonging to JOHN HUBBARD - were transferred from. The object of this would then have been to prevent the scene of the criminal operation behind the PanAm 103 bombing, namely (London Heathrow), from later being revealed as more facts of the case were exposed and/or the case was resolved.

MEBO also found out that flight PA-639 from Berlin-Tegel was no longer in operation in PanAm’s winter flight schedule 1988/89 (valid from 31st October 1988) and therefore didn’t exist. It has to be assumed that for criminal reasons, someone later carried out the overwriting and, in so doing, inadvertently picked the wrong flight out of the PanAm autumn flight plan (1-30 October 1988) with which the previously listed flight number PA-107 was overwritten on the worksheet. According to the winter flight plan 1988/89 flight PA-639 was no longer in operation in the month of December 1988.
In addition it would have to be investigated whether and how the overwriting was done on the original worksheet no. 0000074, or if it was only on the Crown Office’s copy (Court evidence prod. No. 0000074). All the original documents are being securely kept under lock and key at the Federal Crime Bureau (Bundes Kriminal Amt – BKA) in Meckerheim, Germany.

Because of the overwriting on the worksheet, MEBO followed the trail backwards. The flight PA-637 from Berlin-Tegel was late and didn’t arrive in Frankfurt until 10.48 instead of 9.50. The connecting flight PA-107 was at this time preparing for ‘closed and off-block’. For this reason the 8 connecting passengers could only be transferred onto flight PA-107 without their baggage. The 9 bags belonging to the passengers and 2 bags with R-tags (JOHN HUBBARD’s bags), so a total of 11 bags from PA-637 which were booked onto the transfer flight PA-107 could not be transferred as the aircraft was due to go ‘off-block’. The 11 on-line bags were later transferred from the ‘off-block track’, now from PA-107 (no longer from PA-637/639?) in hall Mitte at Coding Counter HM/4 between 11.56 and 12.07 onto flight PA-103/a, with the inter-line code (S-0072-2) and the following trays:
Tray No. : B-0622, B-1898, B-4971, B-8238, B-12244, B-11435, B-10852, B-6696, B-6559, B-6391, B-2377

NB. The mysterious overwriting on the worksheet (Prod. 0000074), second line, was completed in the following order:

Original state, PA-107, time 11.56 – 12.03. An enquiry revealed that the no. 107 was overwritten with the digits 639 at a much later time, although the PA-107 time was not corrected – a further error.

This second worksheet shouldn’t have been overwritten, because for the aircraft flight PA-637/639 (?) which had arrived earlier at 10.48, there would have had to have been a first, unopened worksheet!

Flashback: The illogical sequence of the overwriting constitutes a further flaw.

1st Worksheet unpublished: Baggage from PA-637/639 (?) transfer to PA-107. 11 bags from the delayed PanAm flight PA-637/639 (?) from Berlin-Tegel (TXL) were coded shortly after 10.48 at Counter HM2 and delivered to the reserved transfer flight PA-107. Because flight PA-107 to London-Heathrow (LHR) was already closed for baggage, the baggage was positioned at the off-block track of the Boeing PA-107.

2nd Worksheet No. 0000074, (HM/5 error), correct HM/4: Baggage now from PA-107 onto PA-103/A. The 11 bags inclusive of the 2 Hubbard bags from ex flight PA-637/639 (?) were now rebooked from flight PA-107 onto flight PA-103/A to (LHR—NY/JFK—USA).

Thus an error had been made in the overwriting on the 2nd worksheet no. 0000074 of the second last flight PA-107 with the first flight PA-639 (?). As a ‘rebooked’ had been faked, flight PA-637/639 (?) on the 1st of HM2’s worksheets should have been overwritten with PA-107 and not the other way round.

This type of irrational error of judgement is characteristic of manipulations which are carried out after the event. Because the ‘planners’ of the Lockerbie affair were hindered by the unintentionally telling nature of the luggage transfer intersection point, with reference to the Berlin-Tegel baggage including JOHN HUBBARD’s 2 bags, the flight number 107 was later written over on worksheet No. 0000074 with the unscheduled flight PA-639.
According to the PanAm winter flight schedule 1988/89 there was no flight PA-639. Thus the overwriting of PA-107 was intended to cover up the incident relating to as well as the origin of the 2 HUBBARD ‘Samsonite’ bags which had been transferred with the 9 other bags from Berlin-Tegel via PA-103 to London-Heathrow.
These details may be compared with the entries in the original logbook of FAG/s traffic assistant GUNTHER KASTELEINER, witness no. 799. It is not surprising that in this connection all arrival times of PanAm flights from Berlin-Tegel had been erased from the court’s logbook copies. (Production 1062, Image 3)

By whom, and why? In addition it became known that at the publishers of the World Airways Guide in England, Scottish officials quickly withdrew all flight schedule documents (winter 1988) from the archives supposedly to prevent access to the current flight details. Presumably this was intended to hide the truth, namely of the impossibility timewise of a direct transfer of baggage from PA-643 (TXL) to PA-103/A (FRA).

As can be verified bag no. **B-8849 had, according to FAG/PA regulation to be registered on the FAG baggage distribution system. The fact that the PTM/LDM- Telex was not transmitted until 11.26, that is to say after the ‘off-block’ of flight PA-643 in Berlin-Tegel, confirms that flight PA-643 had arrived punctually in Frankfurt, almost at the same time as the arrival of MaltaAir KM-180. The arrival times are as follows:
On-block time of PanAm PA-643 in (FRA): 12.45
On-block time of MaltaAir KM-180 in (FRA): 12.48
On-block time of PanAm PA-124 changed to flight no. PA-103/A in (FRA): 15.49.
Coding of the baggage of both aircraft, MaltaAir KM-180 and PanAm PA-643 at the same time at Counter No. 206 in hall V3 between 13.04 – ** 13/07 – 13.10.
*FAG, Division, FA11 central control baggage handling organisation, (FRA), regulation, order:
If the flight were there earlier, three-quarters of an hour earlier, then it would be entered into the FAG baggage-system. (Ref. Witness number 817, Roland O’Neil, Kamp van Zeist)

Further data.
From the feeder flight PanAm PA-103/A there were on the main flight PA-103:
A total of 40 adult passengers and 2 children, including 1 passenger from Berlin-Tegel (TXL), recorded by name with their 47 checked-in bags, all of which were able to be assigned to their owners. (+11 Bag's unaccompanied, Total 58 Bag's)

Baggage balance control calculation from PanAm, Flight PA-103/A, up to date 10. October 2003

Edwin Bollier, 9.2. 2003.

Summary:- From the six feeder-flights, on that day, all the Berlin Tegel (TXL), on-line passenger and baggages, transfer to PA-103/A, at Frankfurt Airport: 21Dec.1988

BERLIN-TEGEL (TXL)-TRANSIT-PASSAGIERE auf PA-103/A und PA-103/B

Here once again the incompetence of the Defence Team Duff & Taylor is brought to the fore, to the detriment of the convicted Abdelbaset Al Megrahi. Amongst other things the team was incapable both in the original trial as well as in the appeal of furnishing the court with exact figures relating to the number of pieces of baggage, not to mention the team’s extreme carelessness which certainly accounted for the failure of Megrahi’s appeal.

Excerpt, Appeal, 30.01.2002:
At least 14 unaccompanied bags were loaded onto the PanAm American flight that exploded over Lockerbie, an appeal court has heard. Defence lawyer William Taylor says the original trial, which convicted Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, did not pay enough attention to security at Heathrow. Mr. Taylor said there were 14 unaccompanied bags on that flight. Airport records showed 132 pieces of luggage were loaded onto the plane but passenger records accounted for only 118. He said: ‘The general submission is that if there is one unaccompanied bag on an airplane, it might give rise to a strong inference that it contained the bomb.

Commentary by MEBO:
According to the grossly negligent and unprofessional baggage survey by Defence Team Duff & Taylor not only one but several ‘Bomb Bags’ (IED’s) could have been smuggled onto flight PanAm 103! Therefore to an extent one can understand the Kamp van Zeist court’s miscarriage of justice.

Why an alleged ‘Bomb Bag’? The possibility should not be excluded that for the bombing of PanAm PA-103 over LOCKERBIE an unknown source utilised a professionally positioned IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED), without any ‘Samsonite’ bag and without any Toshiba radio recorder. Could it be that the combination of mysterious incidents surrounding the bombing were intended to cover up the true crime?

The second criminal and discriminatory assumption in the Lockerbie affair was made against the Libyan state in order that a link with the accused in the Lockerbie bombing, ABDELBASET AL MEGRAHI be created.

As the Scottish officials investigating the Lockerbie case were quick to point out to the world media, an alleged fragment of an electronic timer was found during the course of the large-scale investigations of the Boeing 747 PanAm flight PA-103 which crashed over Lockerbie.

Officials came to the conclusion very quickly that the fragment originated from a MEBO MST-13 timer, which activated the explosive device in a Toshiba radio recorder. It was specified that the company MEBO LTD had delivered 20 such MST-13 timers to the Libyan army. According to the investigating officials the necessary link MEBO- LIBYA – MEGRAHI – FHIMAH had thus been made, resulting in the two Libyans Fhimah and Megrahi being found guilty on 14 November 1991.

Further thorough research in relation to the MEBO MST-13 timer question produced the following outcome:

It is true to say that 2 years before the Lockerbie disaster the company MEBO LTD supplied the Libyan army with 20 electronic timers of type MEBO MST-13. These timers were equipped with machine-manufactured PC boards from a company called TÜHRING.

At the outset the company MEBO LTD had produced 3 hand-finished PC boards for the prototype series of the MST-13 timers. 2 PC boards were used for the construction of 2 operational MST-13 prototype timers which were left with the former State Security Service (STASI) at the Institute for Technical Research in BERNAU in the former GDR (German Democratic Republic) for test purposes. 1 hand-finished empty MST-13 timer ‘board’ – i.e. (not fitted with electronic parts) was according to the questionable statement of MEBO’s former engineer Ulrich Lumpert allegedly broken and then thrown away by him (?)

In the course of MEBO’s private investigations it was ascertained beyond any doubt that the alleged fragment of an MST-13 timer found in Lockerbie did not originate from a timer which had been delivered to Libya!

The timer fragment was photographed at the start of 1989 at RARDE in its original state before forensic tests were carried out on it. By means of an enlargement of this photo to 2 mega pixels engineer Lumpert was able to recognize and state with certainty that the fragment originated from a hand-finished MST-13 timer PC board.

In addition, witness no. 550, engineer Lumpert, made false statements in the Kamp van Zeist courtroom to the detriment of Abdelbaset Al Megrahi and Libya, statements which were confirmed by means of an AFFIDAVIT and their content corrected to reflect the truth. The affidavit was authenticated by a notary on the 4th of May 2001.

The AFFIDAVIT and further details related to the MST-13 timer fragment have been published in PART B of the MEBO webpage, http://www.mebocom-defilee.ch


Text: "Baggage-Balance"
Image: Interline Baggages
Image: 12 Pieces On-Line
Image: Logbook "Karsteliner"
Image: Arbeitszettel S-0072+Z
Image: Arbeitszettel S-0074+Z
Image: Passenger-List
Image: TELEX
Image: Berlin-Flugplan-1988
Image: Berlin-Flugplan-1988/89
Text: Lumpert "Affidavit"

COPYRIGHT C by Mahnaz&Edwin Bollier-Tavakol

This Production no. ZS 564327887 only for the applay by the SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION. (SCCRC)

All rights for this Production no. ZS 564327887 reserved. Distribution, transmission, or stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying or otherwise, without the prior written permission on the Publishers, Edwin&Mahnaz Bollier-Tavakoli. Protocol published in Switzerland 4.November 2003. E-mail: mahnaz@bluewin.ch

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