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Report from MEBO, as sent to the Scottish Crown April 2000.
The report was original sent to me in technical German (or rather Swinglish!) and the English translation is therefore mine (so are the errors - before anyone judges me, TRY TRANSLATING THE REPORT YOURSELF IN LESS THAN 2 HOURS!)
Original hardcopies of the full German report is available from me by request.
Forensic pictures from the report:




"US NATIONAL SECURITY" CLASSIFICATION OF PAN AM 103 IS THE REAL REASON THE GLOBAL COVER-UP ?

Why USA- National Security ? The Tragedy Occured in Grossbrittanien !

Grateful for the assistance from the Swiss Legal Aid, people from MEBO have - finally after 8 years - received persmission to examine the alleged found fragment from a MST-13 timer at the devises of the Scottish Police. Thus it became clear to MEBO, that the shown fragment (Police no. DP 31A and B) is coming from a PC board that was never equipped with any electrical parts. This allegedly original fragment differs also from the fragment that the FBI and Scottish Ploice showed us on a photography in 1990 during international investigations. The latter incident was filed down in police protocols reports as well as signed by E. Bollier. (The latter was the fragment that FBI forensic expert Thomas Thurman allegedly found on June 15, 1990 and identified by him.)

After visting the Scottish Police 13/09/99 it became clear to MEBO that the shown fragment must be from a non-functional MST-13 timer (an empty PC board). (See Scottish Police Witness Statement 17/9/99).

After this, we hereby declare:

1) That the fragment does NOT come from the 20-item MST-13 order, delivered to the Libyan Army.

2) That the fragment is NOT coming from the two MST-13 prototype timers delivered in 1985 to the GDR (Institut for Technical Research, ITU, Bernau).

3) MEBO is today convinced that the central and purposedly manipulated piece of evidence is serving to fabricate a link between Lockerbie and Libya! In order to accuse the Libyans of having carried out the attack on Pan Am 103!

MEBO AG has - after visting the Scottish Police and after clearing the matter of the MST-13 timer - concerned with further investigation of the technical incapabilities. We asked ourselves this question:

Why is the investigation of Pan Am 103 classified under "National Security" ?

1) The investigation of the crashed aircraft TWA 800 in 1996 on the coast of New York is not classified as "national security", even though investigations have not rule out any attack. The aircraft is of the same type as Pan Am 103; Boeing 747-100.

2) The crashed aircraft Pan Am 103, type Boeing 747-121, was a cicil passenger airliner; - why is the investigation then classified "national security" ?

3) It is well known that the flight was an official drug crarrier.

4) that several secret service employees from the CIA, DEA and ISA were aboard Pan Am 103 and died, among them Maj. Charles McKee CIA ISA

5) That the then still captived US-hostages in Lebanon were released only a short time after the accusation against the two Libyans!

6) That some of VIP people were warned not to board PA-103, and then rebooked after short notice, while the INtelligence people were not notified, why ?

7) What is still hiding behind the veil, classified with the stamp "national security" ?

MEBO - searching for possible reasons - has stumbled upon following (questions - red.) :

Where exatcly did the explosion take place inside the cargo hold ?

MEBO will prove, that the explosion aboard Pan Am 1+3 did NOT take place inside the container AVE 4041 PA !

The alleged explosion inside container AVE 4041 PA.

The AAIB in Scotland reached the conclusion, that the explosion took place in container AVE 4041 PA, cargo hold position 14L.

In the said container there was supposedly to have been a Samsonite suitcase type Silhouette 4000, made in Denver, Colorado. In this suitcase, there was supposedly a radio recorder mark Toshiba type RT-8016/SF16 Bombeat, filled with 300 gram Semtex-H and one MST-13 timer from MEBO Ag.
This radio recorder (IED=Improvised Explosive Device) is supposedly to have been put in the Samsonite suitcase together with clothes and an umbrella, bought in Malta.

4 pieces of such prepared Toshiba recorders were found on the 25th October 1988 in Neuss, Germany, following the police raid called “Autumn Leaves, seized at the hideout of a group belonging to the PFLP-GC. A fifth bomb disappeared and allegedly that disappeared bomb did supposedly explode inside container AVE 4041 PA.

When the two Libyans, Mr. Abdelbasset al Megrahi and Mr. Khalifa Fhima were indicted and accused at the US press conference on November 14, 1991 in Washington, Attorney-General designate William Barr and FBI director Williams Sessions declared that the bomb consisted of a tampered radio recorder mark Toshiba Typ 453 Bombeat. Simultaneously the international press published large pictures of that radio recorder and of the allegedly Lockerbie-found fingernail-seized fragment of the radio main board no. 101/L106.

Attention: This fragment is totally different from the later allegedly found fragment of a MEBO-timer type MST-13, of approximately the same size.

MEBO found out later during a private investigation that the Toshiba Radio-fragment as shown at the above mentioned press conference is NOT from a Toshiba 453 Bombeat ! We reported that fact to an employee of the American (text censored) in 1994, as he visited us in Zurich. Shortly derafter, he sent us a pre-dated 1990 revised forensic suspicion report. In this report, the amount of explosive residue was rised from 300 gram to 400/450 gram, and the Toshiba 453 Bombeat Recorder was replaced with another type, Toshiba RT 8016/SF16 ! It would be left to test whether there is sufficient space inside this relative small 2-speaker radio recorder to facilitate this amount of explosive residue and one timer ? Investigations carried out by MEBO have proved, that the so-called Toshiba 8016/SF16 was ONLY for sale inside the USA and was never marketized as a Model Bombeat.

The ver same US-expert from (text censored) wrote to us in a letter, dated June 6, 1994: I am a Principal Researcher and have travelled several times to Scotland (and elsewhere in Europe) for in situ research on 103. We are entirely independent, and closely examine all sides of each case. --- As specialist and very experienced researchers we have seen clearly for a few years now, that there is something very strange about the whole Pan Am affair.

MEBO was shown a top-secret FBI photography by the investigational bodies in October 1999. It showed the image of a Toshiba RT 80167SF16. The model mark BOMBEAT was clearly yet significant lacking attached to the radio scale, thus having being altered without doubt.

Why was the Toshiba radio recorder model name changed ?
Originally, US administration charged the Palestinian group PFLP-GC, based in Syria and with affiliate in Neuss, Germany, with having carried out the attack on Pan Am 103. That is why it had to be the altered Toshiba Radio Recorder Type 453 Bombeat from Neuss, Germany. It was said that the PFLP-GC had carried out the attack on Pan Am 103, as ordered by Iran, an action of revenge for the shooting down of the Iran Air Flight IR 655 (290 dead) by the warship USS Vincennes.

As the Gulf War was planned in 1991, USA was in use of Syria as a war ally and it was important to keep Iran quiet. Syria had already been accused by the USA to having played a part in the downing of Pan Am 103. Thus it was evident for the US, that they could not cooperate with Syria in the Gulf War under such premises. It seems the USA transferred the hindrance (for cooperation with Syria red.) to Libya, one only had to change a few premises.

With a nearly perfect plan, Intelligence probably knitted together a new variant (of the story red.) that went from Malta over Frankfurt to Heathrow, eventually accusing the two Libyans of being guilty of the attack on Pan Am 103 from A to Z. On the 14. Of November 1991 the officially indictment was presented to Libya and "desert Storm" could begin! Also, the US-hostages, held captive in Syrian controlled Lebanon for years, were released shortly after this!

Yet when the planning of the attack was transferred to Libya, several evident errors occurred. The pieces to the outline of that puzzle didn't quite fit! We hope that the Scottish Court in Camp Zeist (in which we have good trust) will pay special attention to these new informations.

There was no explosion in container AVE 4041 PA !!!

MEBO is certain that the explosion did NOT occur in container AVE 4041 PA, rather than at the POSITION/STATION /700 directly at the interior wall in front of the container AVE 4041 PA. MEBO declares why ?

New forensic pictures of the explosion site in the cargo room of Pan Am 103 are in the possesion of MEBO Ag. They show clearly that the explosion happened directly on the fuselage skin, at the intersection of Frame no. 700 and stringer no. 39L, at station 700 and NOT in container AVE 4041 PA, position 14L!

Technical details:
All named figures are available in the official report of the AAIB 2/90. The forensic photographies show clearly that frame no. 700 at the intersection of stringer L39 was cut through due to direct contact with explosive material. (Figure 11)

Also, a 20 cm long piece of the light metal stringer no 39L was cut oblique through. The structures of the cut surflaces are typical signs of explosive material coming into direct contact with frame no. 700 and stringer no. 39L (figure F-11 and B-15)

Another sign is the well viewed deformation of the opposite frame no. 680, at the same height as stringer no. 38, 39 and 40. Such deformation could only happen in the case of a very strong negative schockwave vectoring from the centre of the explosion (frame no. 700) horizontal upon the frame no. 680. The fibreglass cover/shell of those frames work to thicken the protective walls in moment of explosion. (figure F-11)

If the explosion had taken place inside container AVE 4041, the explosive schockwave would have:

1) been strongly weakened and softened by the radio recorder, the clothes, the hardened Samsonite suitcase walls, the container metal wall and the fiberglas-cover of the frames. Additionally, the biggest part of the schockwave would have hit the frame no. 680 vertically and could not have caused such kind of deformation of frame no. 680 (figure F-11).

2) Not been able to damaged the outer wall with the broad structured impact and would not have downed the plane, as 300 grams of explosive Semtex-H would not have been enough to cause a major schockwave pressure! According to experts this amount (of explosive material- red.) would cause 3-4 p.s.i in the center (of the explosion ? red.). Had the explosion found place in container AVE 4041, the negative and positive schockwaves, as described in (absatz) no. 2, would have been far to weak. Also, the distance from the center of the explosion to the skin area affected by the blast is a far to large distance for causing the specific damage of the fuselage. The AAIB put the distance to 25?? or 63,5 cm. (Figure F-12)

3) A stringer is in aviation terms a horizontal U-shaped aluminium profile which intersect the vertical frames in a distance of 25 cm. The frames are very stable vertical put, milled double T profiles with a width of 18 cm, that are put to each other in a distance of about 55 cm and keep the fuselage together. On the liught metal stringers, the outer skin of the fuselage is attached with bolts. The stringers are situated between the frames.) (Figure B-14)

4) Additionally, the secured metal parts of and around frame 39L show exact rupture structures, that could only have happened if they have been close to the center of the explosion! (Figure B-15)

5) Fiberglass plates (dm 1,7 mm) with a width of about 55 cm are attached with screws over the frames and contain a sort of space with a width of 20 cm between the outer and inner skin of the fuselage. (It is currently not possible to determine whether the Boeing series 747-100 contain such fiberglass cover plates.)

Errors and critical comments in/to the official AAIB report!

On August 6th, 1990 the Aircraft Accident Report was commisioned to the Dept. of Transpor t in Farnborough. The Accident Report was already concluded on 2/90.

In charge of the report is Mr. M.M. Charles, Investigator-in-Chief with his crew of 19 Inspectors and with the aid of 22 investigative organizations (AAIB appendix A).

In my opinion, the team has not approached the investigation of the explosion in a serious and professional manner!

Proofs:
The skin structure damage diagram, (N739PA), as shown in AAIB report 2/90, figure F-12, shows 2 non-forgivable and irresponsible errors, that probably led to the false track of the explosive blast !!!

1) In the diagram they have failed to show, that the frame no. 680 has a strong deformation/bending (frame 680, over the vertical length, intersection of stringer no. 38, 39 and 40).

2) They also forgot to show the ¾ part of a piece from stringer no. 39L. This stringer is cut and parted in two oblique cut parts, (typical breaking-structure, evolving from a direct contact with an explosive detonator)!

3) The bending structure of frame no. 680 supports the notion that the explosive material has to have been situated in about the same height contrary to frame no. 680, close to the frame no. 700. The frame profile of no. 680 could only be bent (and not cut through as during the impact of a sirect contact with an explosion) through the force of the reverse negative-horizontal schockwave, which is weaker than the forward-positive schockwave of the explosion (distance about 50 cm.)

Was it on purpose, that the report didn't cover the fact that the explosion had to have taken place at the intersection of stringer no. 39L and frame no. 700 ? Because on the forensic photographs in the AAIB report, reconstruction F-11, the points no. 1 + 2 were kept with their facts!

And also forensic photographies in the AAIB report figure B-15 (details of shatter zone of fuselage) show clearly the stringer no. 39L with the oblique slized fractured surfaces. Additionally, other shown sections from the shatter zone, figure B-15, carry typical signs, that could only erupt from a direct explosion in absolute proximity. Had an explosion occurred in container AVE 4041 PA, the distance (25?= 63,5 cm) would have been to large to show such typical rupture structures on the secured metal parts, as shown in figure B-15.

Paradox:
In the AAIB report on page 56 on 3. Conclusion (findings VI) is the following notion included in the finishing statement: An improvised explosive device detonated in luggage container serial number AVE 4041 PA which had been loaded at position 14L in the forward hold. This placed the device approximately 25 inches (63,5 cm) inboard from the skin on the lowe left side of the fuselage at station 700.

Under section (VIII) in the AAIB report, the paradoxal notion: The direct explosive forces produced a large whole in the fuselage structure and disrupted the main cabin floor. Major cracks continued to popegate from the large hole under the influence of the service differential.

It is evidentially lacking that the AAIB team did not use a more professional approach as to the investigation of that "area of blast section", since the conclusion would have been that there was no explosion in container AVE 4041 PA!

In the forward cargo hold there is situated a large grill-shaped floor with two profile-tracks for the containers. Through the grill-shaped floor the floor of the fuselage is visible, i.e. on position 14L of container AVE 4041 PA. Through the floor at station P700 the fuselage floor contains only fiberglass water- and detouring water pipes. In the side hull of the cargo room as well as on the floor of the fuselage below the containers there are NO electric steering or functional cables nor any hydraulic cables that could have been damaged by any explosion. Any explosion pressurewave could easily have spread out in this room, as the floor is open through its grill-shaped structure.

The containers (moving by rubber rolls) are being put into their proper positions through positioned leading-tracks. There there are fastened and fixed. The container floor then is positioned about 4 cm. above the cargo hold floor. The side distance between the containers is about 0-5. cm, mostly fixed.

he cargo hold is throughout its entire length connected with a so-called air-bridge (a pressure hatch connected with the passenger rooms). In case of an explosion in the cargo hold, the pressure would spread evenly through the cargo and passenger rooms. According to the manufacturer Boeing the pressure gauge inside the passenger and the cargo hold is equally, i.e. of the same pressure. Shortly after take-off the pressure in both departments of the aircraft is held constantly around a height of 2400 meters above sea level, regardless of the aircraft climbing to 11000 meters. Thus an altimeter detonating device would not have functioned aboard the aircraft!

The fibreglass cover inside the cargo hold are fastened with cross-screws, and it would be possible in a short amount of time to loosen these screws in order to insert explosive materials in the empty space between the fuselage skin and the inner cover/shell. Expert tests have shown that it is sufficient to loosen only 6 cross-screws in order to bend the fibreglass cover/shell so much to the outside, that it is possible to insert and IED including a detonating device and explosive material next to frame no. 700 !

The last service check (BASE-2) of the named Boeing 747-121 Contructor's serial 19646, was carried out on December 13, 1988, 8 days before the crash. The Boeing aircraft had at that time consumed 72,374 flight hours, yet after the crash the counter showed 72,464 flight hours. Thus the Boeing aircraft had consumed 90 flight hours during 8 days. Where was the aircraft during the rest of that time ?

A new investigation of these findings is of utmost nescessity and importance for all parts involved. If our new findings are backed by experts. The charges against the two pre-judicied Libyan victims;

Mr. Abdelbasset Ali Mohamed al Megrahi and Mr. Al Amin Khalifa Fhima must be dropped.

It is then only nescessary to investigate which professional person and on which place, the IED= Improvised Explosive Device was inserted at frame no. 700, at the height of stringer no. 39L, station 700. The question remains: what is the reason for NATIONAL SECURITY ?

(Beilagen)
Forensic report, schemes, explosive schockwave calculations, construction drafts etc.
NB. On May 8, 2000, has Boeing confirmed to us, that also series 100of the Boeing 747'es had frames and stringers attached with (verticalseperator panels) fibreglass covers/shells



The official AAIB report (as named in this report here) at http://www.open.gov.uk/aaib/n739pa.htm




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